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1
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT EXEMPTIONS AND THE 
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY: ARE SALES REPRESENTATIVES 
ENTITLED TO OVERTIME? 
Steven I. Locke1
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceuticals industry is enormous.  More than three billion prescrip-
tions are written each year for approximately 8,000 products.2  According to 2004 
statistics, these prescriptions were filled by 54,000 retail pharmacies, and sales 
totaled $168 billion.3  Some more recent estimates put global sales totals in excess 
of $820 billion.4  Although drug companies engage in direct advertising, the bulk 
of promotions are aimed directly at doctors and other medical prescribers.5  Re-
ported amounts on this type of promotional spending vary, with the yearly range 
being between four and fourteen billion dollars.6  This type of activity is done 
through face-to-face advocacy by sales representatives who visit doctors’ offices 
and hospitals in order to meet with prescribing health care professionals.7  The av-
erage primary care physician interacts with no less than twenty-eight sales repre-
sentatives each week, and the average specialist interacts with fourteen.8   
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2006, the pharmaceutical indus-
try employed 292,000 workers across the country.9  Of this number, it has been 
 ________________________  
 1. Steven I. Locke is a founding partner of Carabba Locke LLP and practices extensively in the areas of 
labor and employment law. 
 2. Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace, Kaiser Family Foundation [hereinafter 
Trends and Indicators], available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec1.cfm (cited in IMS Health Inc. v. 
Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 70 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 3. Id.
 4. Press Release, NAPRx Forecasts 4.5 – 5.5 Percent Growth for Pharmaceutical Market in 2009, Exceed-
ing $820 Billion (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.prlog.org/10164237-naprx-forecasts-45-55-percent-
growth-for-pharmaceutucals. 
5. IMS Health, 550 F.3d at 46. 
 6. Id.
7. See, e.g., IMS Health, 550 F.3d at 70 n.17 (concurring and dissenting opinion) (collecting references 
Susan Okie, AMA Criticized for Letting Drug Firms Pay for Ethics Campaign, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001 at A3 
(the industry spent about $4 billion in 2000); Memorandum from Rep. Harry Waxman, to the Democratic Mem-
bers of the Committee on Government Reform, The Marketing of Vioxx to Physicians, at 6 n.15 (May 5, 2005) 
(the $5.7 billion in 2003); Trends and Indicators, supra note 2, at 22 ($7.8 billion in 2004); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & 
Jeff Gerth, High-Tech Stealth Being Used to Sway Doctors Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000 at A1 ($13.9 
billion in 1999). 
 8. Id. at 47; Consumers Union, Prescription for Change, 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/drugreps.pdf. 
 9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Career Guide to Industries, Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing, 
Table 1, Employment of wage and salary workers in pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing by occupation, 
2006 and projected change, 2006-2016 (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/CGS009.htm (accessed Apr. 
29, 2009). 
1
: Fair Labor Standards and the Pharmaceuticals Industry
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
2 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
estimated that as many as 100,000 serve as sales representatives.10  Employers pre-
fer to give these sales representative positions and other related jobs to college gra-
duates, particularly those with science backgrounds, and most new sales repre-
sentatives must complete “rigorous formal training programs” involving their em-
ployer’s products.11  Recent yearly salary estimates for sales representatives vary 
with some surveys indicating a range between $85,000 and $110,000.12  Overall 
compensation, however, can increase dramatically depending on whether sales 
quotas for the sales representatives are met or exceeded.13
Presently, and as explained in detail below, a battle is raging in the courts as to 
whether these highly compensated sales representatives are entitled to overtime pay 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or the “Act”), or whether they are 
excluded from such an entitlement under one or more of the Act’s “exemptions.”  
As these cases are winding their way through the United States District Courts and 
appeals are starting to be taken, this article conducts a review of the courts’ various 
conflicting positions and charts a course for addressing the issue before the Courts 
of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted by Congress in 193814 to correct 
and eliminate labor conditions “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of work-
ers.”15  The cornerstone of the Act was to provide minimum wages and overtime 
pay for covered workers.16  According to these requirements, covered employees 
 ________________________  
 10. See, e.g., Linda Wang, Prescription for Success in Sales, EMP. OUTLOOK, Vol. 85, No. 8 at 43-46 (Feb. 
19, 2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/employment/85/8508employment.html (“In the past 10 [sic] years, 
the number of pharmaceutical sales representatives in the U.S. has tripled from 35,000 in 1995 to 100,000 today, 
says Bob Davenport, vice president and managing director for the consulting firm Hay Group”). See also John 
Mack, Fewer Sales Reps Lead to Higher Costs, Nov. 10, 2008, http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2008/11/less-
sales-reps-lead-to-higher-costs.html citing Anthony Vecchione, Sales Force Report: Loop of Faith, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, Nov. 2008, at 38, available at http:/www.mmm-online.com/Sales-Force-Report-Loop-of-
Faith/article/120164/ (sales force numbers have been declining since 2005 when they peaked at 99,910 to 97,963 
in 2006 and 94,308 in 2007.  The number further declined in 2008 to 91,652).  Accord In re Novartis Wage & 
Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that of 13,000 employees nationwide, 6000 were 
sales representatives); Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp.2d 459, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (compa-
ny employs “about 2400” pharmaceutical representatives); Wang, supra note 10 (GlaxoSmithKline had approx-
imately 10,000 sales representatives in 2007). 
 11. Trends and Indicators, supra note 2. 
 12. Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Salary Survey Data, Economic Research Institute (Apr. 29, 2009), 
http://www.erieri.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=research.Pharmaceutical-Sales-Representatives (comparing salaries 
for Charlotte, North Carolina, Orlando, Florida, Phoenix, Arizona, Indianapolis, Indiana, Dallas, Texas, Atlanta, 
Georgia, Manhattan, New York, Houston, Texas, Los Angeles, California and Chicago, Illinois). 
 13. See, e.g., Clint Cora, Starting Salary and Income Ranges for Pharmaceutical Drug Sales Representa-
tives (June 6, 2007), 
http://www.yoursdaily.com/layout/set/print/money/starting_salary_and_income_ranges_for_pharmaceutical_drug
_sales_representatives.  Accord Mack, supra note 10 (average total compensation in 2007 for pharmaceutical sales 
representatives was $94,200 which would be higher than the average salary). 
 14. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
201-19).   
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (providing for minimum wage and overtime). 
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/1
Fall 2009 Fair Labor Standards and the Pharmaceuticals Industry 3
are entitled to a minimum hourly wage for each hour worked17 and at least one and 
one-half times an employee’s regular wage rate for hours worked over forty in a 
given workweek.18  According to the Department of Labor, the minimum wage and 
overtime pay requirements are “among the nation’s most important worker protec-
tions.”19
The FLSA also contains various exemptions from the overtime requirement 
for, among others, executive, professional, and administrative workers, and outside 
salespersons.20 These “exemptions” cover millions of workers.21  As a matter of 
law, these exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to 
assert them and will be limited to those workers “plainly and unmistakably” within 
the exemptions’ “terms and spirit.”22  The burden of invoking these exemptions 
rests with the employer.23  According to the Department of Labor: 
The legislative history [of the Fair Labor Standards Act] indicates 
that [the Act’s] exemptions were premised on the belief that the 
workers exempted typically earned salaries well above the mini-
mum wage, and they were presumed to enjoy other compensatory 
privileges such as above average fringe benefits and better oppor-
tunities for advancement setting them apart from the nonexempt 
workers entitled to overtime pay.  Further, the type of work they 
performed was difficult to standardize to any time frame and could 
not easily be spread to other workers after 40 hours in a week, 
making compliance with the overtime provisions difficult and gen-
erally precluding the potential job expansion intended by the 
FLSA’s time-and-a-half overtime premium.24
Of particular relevance to overtime claims brought by pharmaceutical sales 
representatives are the exemptions for outside salespersons and administrative em-
ployees.25    
 ________________________  
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (providing that presently the minimum hourly wage is $7.25 under the FLSA). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 19. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Adminis-
trative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123 (Apr. 23, 
2004) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
 20. 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(1) (2009).  The exemption for executive, professional and administrative employees 
is commonly referred to as the “white-collar exemptions.”  See, e.g., Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA,
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 1 (2001) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the FLSA and its history). 
 21. Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can Enforce 
State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS. 495, 501 (2006). 
 22. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 362 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); Davis v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 453 F.3d 
554, 556 (3d Cir. 2006); Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 23. Bilyou, 300 F.3d at 222. 
 24. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22123-24. 
 25. Compare Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Conn. 2008) (find-
ing sales representatives to be non-exempt and therefore covered by the FLSA’s overtime provisions) with In re
Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that sales representatives are 
exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions both as outside salesmen and administrative employees). 
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OUTSIDE SALESMAN EXEMPTION
Employers are granted an exemption from the FLSA’s overtime requirements 
for outside salespersons as that term is defined by the Department of Labor’s regu-
lations.26  Because the FLSA grants the Secretary of Labor the broad authority to 
define and delimit the exemptions to the statute’s overtime requirements, the regu-
lations have the force of law and will be controlling unless found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.27   The Department of Labor also 
promulgates regulations setting forth the Secretary’s position on how the regula-
tions should be applied.  These interpretations, although lacking the force of law, 
may be relied upon for guidance by courts and litigants.28
The purpose of the outside sales exemption was explained by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sixty years ago in Jewel Tea Co. v. Wil-
liams:
[The] salesman, to a great extent, work[s] individually.  There are 
no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as 
much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition 
dictates.  In lieu of overtime, he ordinarily receives commissions 
as extra compensation.  He works away from his employer’s place 
of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his em-
ployer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of 
hours he works per day.29
The standard for whether an employee is exempt as an outside salesman is 
whether an employee’s: 
(1)  primary duty is:   
(i) making sales as that term is defined in section 3(k) of the Act 
or  
(ii) obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of fa-
cilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or cus-
tomer; and 
 ________________________  
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).  See generally Allan J. Schwartz, Who is employed in “capacity of outside 
salesman” within the meaning of § 13(a)(1) of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1)), as amended, 
exempting such employees from minimum wage and overtime requirements of Act, 26 A.L.R. FED. 941 (1976). 
 27. Freeman v. NBC, Inc., 80 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 28. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  See also Roth v. Perseus, LLC, 522 F.3d 242, 247-48 
(2d Cir. 2008) (stating that interpretations of regulations are given deference unless plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with statutes or regulations). 
 29. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 207-08 (10th Cir. 1941). 
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/1
Fall 2009 Fair Labor Standards and the Pharmaceuticals Industry 5
(2) who is customarily and regularly engaged away from the em-
ployer’s place of business in performing the primary duty.30   
The Act defines a “sale” to include “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, con-
signment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”31  The related regula-
tions include in this definition the “transfer of title to tangible property, and in cer-
tain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property.”32
The regulations also distinguish between promotional and sales work.33  Pro-
motional work actually performed incidental to, and in conjunction with, an em-
ployee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt.34  Promotional work that is 
incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else, however, is not exempt.35
Examples of promotional work incidental to sales include a manufacturer’s repre-
sentative who visits a customer’s shop for the purpose of putting up displays and 
posters, removing damaged or spoiled stock from the merchant’s shelves, or rear-
ranging the merchandise.36  By way of illustration, in 1999 the Department of La-
bor issued an opinion letter concluding that college recruitment counselors are not 
exempt as outside salespersons because they do not make sales of a college’s ser-
vices, or obtain contracts for those services.37  This is because such work involves 
identifying customers, in this scenario students, which may lead to an application.  
This is because such work involves identifying customers, which in this scenario 
refers to students, which may lead to an application.38
If the employee at issue makes at least some sales or obtains some orders or 
contracts, then the outside sales exemption may apply, provided that such work 
constitutes the employee’s primary duty.39 The primary duty is the “principal, 
main, major or most important duty that the employee performs.”40  The determina-
tion is made based on all the facts of a case with emphasis on the character of the 
job as a whole,41 although the time spent performing exempt work is a relevant 
guide.42  Relevant factors include whether the job was advertised as a sales job, 
whether the employees were referred to as salespeople, whether they were provided 
with sales training, whether the employees received commissions, and whether 
 ________________________  
 30. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a) (2004). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2009). 
 32. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2004). 
 33. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (2004). 
 34. Id.
 35. Id.
 36. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(b). 
 37. Opinion Letter No. 2138 (Apr. 20, 1999), 1999 DOLWH LEXIS 45. 
 38. Id.
 39. The Department of Labor has stated that it would be improper to extend the outside sales exemption to 
someone who does not “in some sense make a sale.”  Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Public Contracts Div., Report 
and Recommendation of the Presiding Officer on Proposed Revisions of Regulations (Oct. 10, 1940) at 46. See 
also Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22162 (the exemption should apply only where the employee “in some sense, 
has made sales”).
 40. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). 
 41. Id.
 42. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b). 
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they operated independently.43  All work that is “incidental to and in conjunction 
with the employee’s own outside sales or solicitations” and all work that furthers 
the employee’s sales efforts must also be considered exempt outside sales.44  In-
itially, the inquiry focuses on whether the employee’s primary duty is to make ac-
tual sales.45
ADMINISTRATIVE EMPLOYEES
Also relevant to the pharmaceutical sales representatives’ claims for overtime 
is whether these employees qualify as administrative employees and are therefore 
exempt.  The FLSA exempts from coverage “any employee employed in a bona 
fide . . . administrative . . . capacity.”46  To qualify, the employee must earn more 
than $455 per week and his or her primary duties must include: (1) non-manual 
work directly related to the management or general business operations of the em-
ployer or the employer’s customers, and (2) the exercise of “discretion and inde-
pendent judgment” with respect to “matters of significance.”47  With respect to the 
first prong of the test, the work must be “directly” related to management or gener-
al business operations.48  Work that is only indirectly or tangentially related to ad-
ministrative functions will not be considered exempt.49  The inquiry has two parts 
which consider both the type of work at issue and the level or nature of that work.50
In order to satisfy the first prong of the test, the employee has to “perform 
work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as 
distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or 
selling a product in a retail service establishment.”51  Advisory language from the 
Department of Labor in 2004 recognizes: 
As explained in the 1949 Weiss Report, the administrative opera-
tions of the business include the work of employees “servicing” 
the business, such as, for example, “advising the management, 
planning, negotiating, representing the company, purchasing, pro-
moting sales, and business research and control.”  As the current 
regulations state at section 541.205(c), exempt administrative work 
 ________________________  
 43. Edwards v. Alta Colleges, Inc., No SA-03-CA-0538 OG (NN), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3753, at 30 
(W.D. Tex. 2005); Nielsen v. Devry, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756-58 (W.D. Mich. 2003).  See, e.g., Hodgson v. 
Klages Coal & Ice Co., 435 F.2d 377, 382-84 (6th Cir. 1970); Wirtz v. Charleston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 356 
F.2d 428, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1966); Wirtz v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1963); Jewel Tea Co.,
118 F.2d at 208; Olivo v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Fields v. AOL 
Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); Hodgson v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co., 346 F. 
Supp. 1102, 1104-07 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Bradford v. Gaylord Prods., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (N.D. Ill. 
1948); Nunneley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 564 P.2d 231, 235 (Okla. 1977). 
 44. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(b). 
 45. Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 179 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 47. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). 
 48. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22137. 
 49. Id.
 50. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22144. 
 51. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a). 
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/1
Fall 2009 Fair Labor Standards and the Pharmaceuticals Industry 7
includes not only those who participate in the formulation of man-
agement policies or in the operation of the business as a whole, but 
it “also includes a wide variety of persons who either carry out ma-
jor assignments in conducting the operations of the business, or 
whose work affects business operations to a substantial degree, 
even though those assignments are tasks related to the operation of 
a particular segment of the business.”52
The exemption covers a wide variety of workers who carry out major assign-
ments in operating the business or those whose work affects operations to a sub-
stantial degree.53   The Department of Labor has characterized such work as includ-
ing: 
but not limited to, work in functional areas such as tax; finance; 
accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; pur-
chasing; procurement; advertising; marketing; research; safety and 
health; personnel management; human resources; employee bene-
fits; labor relations; public relations; government relations; com-
puter network, internet and database administration; legal and reg-
ulatory compliance; and similar activities.54
The administrative/production distinction, however, is only one tool for deter-
mining the applicability of the exemption and will be dispositive only where the 
work involved “falls squarely on the production side of the line.”55  The inquiry is 
fact specific and requires analysis of statutory and regulatory frameworks as a 
whole.56
With respect to the second prong of the test, the Department of Labor defines 
the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as the “comparison and the 
evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the 
various possibilities have been considered.”57  Here, the term “matters of signific-
ance” addresses the level of importance of the work at issue or the consequence of 
 ________________________  
 52. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22138. 
 53. Id.
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b). 
 55. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22141 (“We do not believe that it is appropriate to eliminate the concept 
entirely from the administrative exemption but neither do we believe that the dichotomy has ever been or should 
be a dispositive test for exemption”).  See Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoted in Department of Labor position).  That being said, some courts have nevertheless used the administra-
tive/production dichotomy as a determinative factor in their analysis.  See, e.g., Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 
126 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (insurance marketers employed by company producing and marketing insurance 
policies were engaged in administrative work because they “are no way involved in the design or generation of 
insurance policies, the very product that the enterprise exists to produce and market”); Martin v. Cooper Elec. 
Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 903 (3d Cir. 1991) (sales employees working for electrical parts wholesaler were en-
gaged in production work because employer’s business purpose was to produce sales of electrical products, the 
work that the employees did). 
 56. Phase Metrics, 299 F.3d at 1127; Webster v. Pub. Sch. Employees of Wash., Inc., 247 F.3d 910, 916 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 57. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a). 
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that work.58 The Department of Labor’s non-exclusive list of factors to consider 
includes whether the employee: 
• has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement man-
agement policies or operating practices;  
• carries out major assignments in conducting the operations of the 
business; 
• performs work that affects the business operations to a substan-
tial degree, even if the employee’s assignments are related to the 
operation of a particular segment of the business; 
• has authority to commit the employer in matters that have signif-
icant financial impact; 
• has authority to waive or deviate from established policies and 
procedures without prior approval;  
• has authority to negotiate and bind the company on significant 
matters; 
• is involved in planning long- or short-term business objectives; 
• investigates and resolves matters of significance on behalf of 
management; and/or 
• represents the company in handling complaints, arbitrating dis-
putes or resolving grievances.59
The list includes those activities “clearly related to servicing the business it-
self” and without which the employer “could not function.”60  This list does not 
include activities centering on what the business at issue specifically sells or pro-
vides.  Rather, these are tasks that every business must engage in to function.61
This requirement is met when the employee engages in running the business itself 
or determining its overall course or policies as opposed to the day-to-day carrying 
out of affairs.62
When two or three of these factors are met, the courts will generally find that 
the employee at issue is exercising discretion and independent judgment sufficient 
 ________________________  
 58. Id.
 59. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b). 
 60. Neary v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 61. Id.
 62. Phase Metrics, 299 F.3d at 1125. 
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to invoke the exemption.63  When considering this test, it is important to note that 
use of well-established techniques, procedures, and specific standards in manuals 
or other sources will not qualify to satisfy the second prong of the test.64  The em-
ployee must have the authority to make an independent choice without immediate 
direction or supervision.65
This requirement may be satisfied even if there is review at a higher level. 66
Accordingly, the exercise of independent judgment does not require that the deci-
sions the employee makes have the type of finality that goes with unlimited author-
ity and absence of review.67  The authority may consist of making recommenda-
tions for action rather than actually taking action.68
The Department of Labor also recognizes that many employees in the same 
business may qualify for this exemption.69  It is up to the employer to establish that 
this test has been satisfied in order for the exemption to apply.70
It should be noted that in 1945, the Department of Labor issued an Opinion 
Letter concluding that “medical detailists” employed by pharmaceutical companies 
are exempt from overtime coverage as administrative employees.71  The work in-
volved increasing the “use of subject’s product in hospitals and through physicians’ 
recommendations.”72  According to the Department, this work required a “high 
degree of technical knowledge.”73 The detailists’ duties were to:
train personnel, make special surveys and reports, and in general 
maintain th[e] company’s relations with the medical and associated 
professions.  They are consulted with respect to individual nutri-
 ________________________  
 63. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22143 (citing Bondy v. City of Dallas, 77 Fed. Appx. 731 (5th Cir. 2003)) 
(making recommendations to management on policies and procedures); McAllister v. Transamerica Occidental 
Life Ins. Co., 325 F.3d 997, 1000-02 (8th Cir. 2003) (independent investigation and resolution of issues without 
prior approval and authority to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without approval); 
Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2000) (developing guidebooks, manuals, and 
other policies and procedures for employer or the employer’s customers); Haywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 
121 F.3d 1066, 1071-73 (7th Cir. 1997) (negotiating on behalf of the employer with some degree of settlement 
authority and independent investigation and resolution of issues without prior approval); O’Neill-Marino v. Omni 
Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 2001 WL 210360 *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (negotiating on behalf of the employer with some 
degree of settlement authority and developing guidebooks, manuals, and other procedures and policies for em-
ployer or the employer’s customers); Stricker v. E. Off-Rd. Equip., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 650, 656-59 (D. Md. 1996) 
(authority to commit employer in matters that have financial impact); Reich v. Haemonetics Corp., 907 F. Supp. 
512, 517-18 (D. Mass. 1995) (negotiating on behalf of the employer with some degree of settlement authority and 
authority to commit employer in matters that have financial impact); Hippen v. First Nat’l Bank, 1992 WL 73554 
*6 (D. Kan. 1992) (authority to commit employer in matters that have financial impact). 
 64. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e). 
 65. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c). 
 66. Id.
 67. Id.
 68. Id. For a summary of these requirements, see Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour 
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #17F: Exempt Outside Sales Employees Under Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) (Rev. July 2008). 
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(d). 
 70. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22144. 
 71. See Applicability of Exemption for Administrative Employees to Medical Detailists, 1943-48 WAGES-
HOURS LAB. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 33,093 (May 19, 1945). 
 72. Id.
 73. Id.
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tional problems encountered by hospitals and physicians, such as 
determining whether the use of subject’s product in a hospital was 
related to the occurrence of an epidemic.  When necessary, they ar-
range for added deliveries of subject’s product to take care of 
emergencies. They instruct the firm’s salesmen in such technical 
matters as disease prevention, the chemical components of their 
product and nutritional research.  They work virtually without su-
pervision. . . .74
Based on these responsibilities, the Department of Labor concluded that the 
medical detailists were involved in matters related to general business operations 
requiring the use of discretion and independent judgment informed by special train-
ing and experience.75 Accordingly, medical detailists were exempt from the Act’s 
overtime requirements.76
THE OVERTIME ANALYSIS AND PHARMACEUTICAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES
Court analysis of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are entitled to 
overtime pay under the FLSA begins with a cluster of court decisions issued by the 
federal district court in the Central District of California addressing whether the 
sales representatives are exempt from overtime requirements under the California 
Labor Law’s exemption for outside sales representatives.77  The facts underlying 
the cases are similar.   
In Barnick v. Wyeth, the plaintiff was hired into Wyeth’s sales staff.78  His es-
sential job function was to “effect sales by educating and guiding health care pro-
fessionals in their purchase and prescription of Wyeth products and by promoting 
treatment practices that are consistent with approved indications.”79  This central 
job duty is consistent across the industry.80
 ________________________  
 74. Id.
75. Id. See Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (pharmaceutical 
company detail person exempt under the FLSA as administrative employee). 
 76. Id.
 77. See Menes v. Roche Labs, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-01444-ER-FFMx, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4230 (C.D. Cal 
Jan. 7, 2008); D’Este v. Bayer Corp, No. CV 07-3206-JFW(PLAx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87229 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 
9, 2007); Barnick v. Wyeth, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  See also Yacoubian v. Ortho-McNeil, Inc., 
No. 07-00127, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27937 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009); Delgado v. Ortho-McNeil, Inc., No. 07-
00263, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28810 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2009); Rivera v. Schering Corp., No. CV 08-1743-
GW(JCx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111105 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2008). 
 78. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1258. 
 79. Id.   
 80. See, e.g., Menes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4230, at *3 (The Sales Representative’s job is “to inform 
medical personnel about Defendant’s drugs in the hope that they will prescribe Roche products to their patients.”); 
D’Este, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87229, at *1 (“[P]harmaceutical representatives . . . are responsible for promoting 
and selling Bayer’s prescription pharmaceutical products to medical care providers, including primary care physi-
cians, specialists, and hospitals.”).  See also Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64 (“PRs are required to be in the 
field visiting medical providers from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and spend time in the evenings preparing for these visits.  
The goal of the visits is to influence the prescription practices of the providers.”); In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d 
at 641 (“The primary function of the Reps is calling on physicians and giving them information about NPC’s
drugs.”); Ruggeri, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (“Plaintiffs’ job duty was, centrally, to visit physicians and pharmacies 
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Barnick’s responsibilities included calling physicians pre-assigned to a specific 
list to discuss Wyeth’s pharmaceutical products, in this case two vaccines, Prevnar 
and FluMist, and two drugs, Altace and Protonix.81  He spent, on average, between 
forty-five and forty-eight hours each week in the field and had a specific number of 
doctors he needed to see within a specified time period and a daily quota of calls to 
make.82  Although his hours were not controlled, and he was rarely subject to direct 
supervision, the plaintiff was expected to work from 8:30 am to 5:00 pm and to log 
physician calls daily, file various reports, check his voicemail three times each day, 
and synchronize his computer once each day.83
Barnick did not, however, sell products directly to physicians.84  Occasionally, 
he provided order forms for vaccines, and sometimes he filled them out.85  The 
doctors would then order the vaccines from Wyeth and prescribe and administer 
the vaccines to patients, or prescribe drugs which would then be ordered through a 
pharmacy.86
The plaintiff referred to himself as a “salesperson” and was trained in sales 
techniques at numerous conferences throughout his employment where managers 
discussed sales data and sales strategies.87  He was paid a yearly salary and re-
ceived additional compensation tied into the sales he assisted in generating.88  Fur-
ther, half of Barnick’s evaluation was based on meeting sales objectives for 
Wyeth’s products.89  The facts in this case are similar to those in D’Este v. Bayer 
Corporation90 and Menes v. Roche Laboratories, both of which, as set forth above, 
were decided in the same judicial district.91
The plaintiffs in each case filed suit claiming, among other things, that they 
were never paid overtime under California’s Labor Code.92  Like the FLSA, the 
California Labor Code and the state Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) pro-
vide that outside salespersons are exempt from the state’s overtime requirements.93
According to the IWC, an outside salesperson is “any person, 18 years or over, 
who customarily and regularly works more than half the working time away from 
the employer’s place of business selling tangible or intangible items or obtaining 
orders or contracts for products, services or use of facilities.”94  The California 
in an assigned geographical territory and present information about, and samples of, Boehringer pharmaceutical 
products.”). 
 81. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1258. 
 82. Id.
 83. Id.
 84. Id.; In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (In fact, the sales representatives are prohibited from selling 
drugs directly to physicians.).   
 85. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59. 
 86. Id. at 1259. 
 87. Id.
 88. Id.
 89. Id.
 90. D’Este, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87229, at *1-3 (setting forth allegations). 
 91. Menes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4230, at *2. 
 92. Barnick, 552 F. Supp. 2d. at 1260 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (Deering 2009)); D’Este, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 87229, at *3; Menes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4230, at *2-3. 
 93. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171; IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001(1)(C), CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11070 (2009). 
 94. IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001(2)(M), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle4.pdf. 
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analysis is quantitative and focuses on whether the employee spends more than 
fifty percent of his or her time in sales activities.95  In Barnick, the court reasoned 
that the California exemption is similar to the FLSA exemption in that exempt out-
side salespersons under both statutes are those generally able to set their own sche-
dules and are generally on the road, without the employer knowing what they are 
doing on an hourly basis.96  As a result, it is difficult to control their hours or work-
ing conditions.97   
Recognizing case law under the FLSA as persuasive authority,98 and applying 
the factors collected from other FLSA cases, the court concluded that the plaintiff-
pharmaceutical sales representative was exempt from California state overtime 
requirements as an outside salesperson because he was hired on the basis of his 
sales experience, to a position which both sides referred to as a sales position, he 
received specialized sales training at sales conferences, his pay was determined in 
part by the sales he generated, he had virtually no direct or constant supervision, 
and he occasionally solicited business.99  Further, the plaintiff, although subject to 
quotas and assigned to a pre-determined list of physicians, was free to decide 
which physician to see and when.100  Accordingly, the court determined summary 
judgment for the defendant was appropriate.101
In reaching this conclusion, the court found “unpersuasive” that the sales rep-
resentative dealt with physicians rather than the end purchasers of the drugs being 
sold.102 According to the court, because the doctors “control” the product’s ulti-
mate purchase through their prescriptions, to conclude that the sales representatives 
are exempt would elevate the form of the salespersons’ work over its substance. 103
The court further concluded that while the Department of Labor’s interpretation of 
the FLSA distinguishes between promotional and sales work based on whether the 
employee obtained some type of commitment for sales, this reasoning was unper-
suasive, and so the court declined to apply it under the California Labor Law.104
Moreover, the fact that the employee’s work did not immediately result in some 
sort of commitment to buy was of no moment, especially where there was no other 
employee who reached out to confirm the sale.105  Rather, this distinction better 
rested on whether the employees’ efforts were addressed to the general public ra-
 ________________________  
 95. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (citing Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 978 P.2d 2, 9 (Cal. 
1999)). 
96. Id. (citing Cal. DLSE, Opinion Letter, Sept. 8, 1998, available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/opinions/1998-09-08.pdf). 
 97. Id.
 98. Id. at 1262-63 (citing Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Serv., Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 615, 623 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990); Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 221, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing 
the interpretations of the federal statute as persuasive authority)). 
 99. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1262-63 (citing Nielsen v. Devry, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756-58 (W.D. 
Mich. 2003) (listing relevant factors)). 
 100. Id. at 1263. 
 101. Id. at 1265. 
 102. Id. at 1264. 
 103. Barnick, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. at 1265 
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ther than an individual.106  The D’Este and Menes courts reached the same conclu-
sion applying similar reasoning.107   
In the D’Este case, the litigants also presented the issue as to whether the sales 
representatives qualified as administrative employees, and were, therefore, exempt 
from the state overtime requirements under an alternative theory.108  Because the 
district court found that the employees were outside salespersons, however, the 
issue was never decided.109
On May 5, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
the D’Este case, which was consolidated with Menes and Barnick for the purposes 
of appeal, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California: 
1. [Under the Industrial Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders] 
[d]oes a pharmaceutical sales representative (PSR) qualify as an 
“outside salesperson” under [the] definition [above], “if the PSR 
spends more than half the working time away from the employer’s 
place of business and personally interacts with doctors and hospit-
als on behalf of drug companies for the purpose of increasing indi-
vidual doctors’ prescriptions of specific drugs?”
2. “In the alternative, Wage Order 4-2001 defines a person em-
ployed in an administrative capacity as a person whose duties and 
responsibilities involve (among other things) ‘[t]he performance of 
office or non-manual work directly related to management policies 
or general business operations of his/her employer or his employ-
er’s customers’ and ‘[w]ho customarily and regularly exercises 
discretion and independent judgment.” . . . Is a PSR, as described 
above, involved in duties and responsibilities that meet these re-
quirements?110
In certifying Question 1, the Court of Appeals expressly noted that while inter-
pretation of the FLSA may be relevant to the analysis of the IWC’s interpretation 
of the outside sales exemption, any assistance in this regard “may be limited” be-
cause the IWC’s exemption language does not closely track the language of the 
analogous federal regulations.111  In certifying Question 2, the appellate court rec-
ognized that the administrative employee exemption under California law is to be 
treated in the same manner as the FLSA regulations.112
 ________________________  
 106. Id.
 107. D’Este, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87229, at *13-16 (also relying on cases decided under the FLSA as 
persuasive authority); Menes, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4230, at *3-7 (adding as a factor that the plaintiff in that case 
could identify and solicit physicians on her own). 
 108. D’Este, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87229, at *16. 
 109. Id.
 110. D’Este v. Bayer Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 111. Id. at 1124 (citing Ramirez, 978 P.2d at 9-10). 
 112. Id. at 1125 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8 § 11040). 
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In the interim, while these cases are working their way through the appellate 
process, the California district court decisions have received mixed reviews in sub-
sequent cases.  In In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation, Judge Crotty in the 
federal district court for the Southern District of New York came to a similar con-
clusion on summary judgment when considering claims brought under the FLSA, 
California Labor Law and New York wage and hour law.  Initially, the Novartis
court decided the issue under the FLSA and New York law without reference to the 
California decisions despite the fact that those decisions relied on an FLSA analy-
sis.113  Here, the central issue was framed as whether the sales representatives were 
exempt because they actually executed “sales” within the meaning of the Act, or 
instead, engaged merely in non-exempt promotional activities.114  This analysis is 
different than that applied by the California cases which focused more on other 
indicia, such as job title, past sales experience necessary to obtain the job, the na-
ture of the job training, and whether compensation was on a commission basis.115
In answering this question in the affirmative, the New York district court first 
acknowledged the policy animating the outside sales exemption as explained by the 
Tenth Circuit: 
Jewel Tea teaches that outside salespersons are exempt from the 
overtime requirement not because they “sell,” as that term is tech-
nically defined, but rather because they (1) generate commissions 
for themselves through their work and (2) work with minimal su-
pervision, making adherence to an-hours based compensation 
scheme impractical.  The Jewel Tea rationale is echoed in the 
DOL’s 2004 Final Rule, which notes that the “white collar” ex-
emptions owe their existence to the fact that the employees they 
were meant to cover “typically earned salaries well above the min-
imum wage, and they were presumed to enjoy other compensatory 
privileges such as above average fringe benefits and better oppor-
tunities for advancement. . . . The DOL Final Rule also recognizes 
that the work done by these employees “was difficult to standard-
ize to any time frame . . . making compliance with the overtime 
provisions difficult.”116
Applying this policy, the court then began its inquiry into whether the plaintiffs 
were actually engaged in sales.117  In starting its analysis, the court recognized that 
any review required examination of the industry at issue.118  In particular, the court 
 ________________________  
 113. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 648-53. 
 114. Id. at 648, 651. 
 115. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
 116. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
 117. Id.
 118. Id. (citing Nielsen, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 755-56 (addressing the exemption in the context of the college 
admissions process); Gregory v. First Title or Amer., Inc., No. 06-Civ.-1746, 2008 WL 150487 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 
2008) (addressing the exemption in the context of the title insurance industry where the plaintiff could not sell the 
insurance herself was nevertheless exempt because she “obtained orders”), aff’d, 555 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2009)).   
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drew on a footnote from an earlier Minnesota decision that took place in the con-
text of the medical devices industry, Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons.119  In Medtronic,
an employment contract case, the court noted that pacemakers are ultimately con-
sumed by patients, not doctors or hospitals to which they are sold.120  Nevertheless, 
the sale was based on a physician recommendation, and so sales efforts are focused 
on doctors and medical personnel.121  As a result, the court in Medtronic reasoned 
that the term “customers” must include not only the hospital that pays for the prod-
uct, but also the doctors who recommend its purchase.122
Similarly, reasoned the Novartis court, the physicians who prescribe pharma-
ceuticals are, in reality, the ones who control the purchase of the drugs by writing 
prescriptions.123  Without the prescriptions, no sales can take place.124   
Plaintiffs argue that “[Novartis] sells drugs to distributors.  Dis-
tributors sell drugs to pharmacies.  Pharmacies sell drugs to indi-
viduals.” . . . In other words, Plaintiffs ask this Court to conclude 
that the only true sales made by [Novartis] are to distributors.  The 
Court cannot ignore reality.  Distributors are not the end-users of 
[Novartis’s] products. If physicians did not prescribe [Novartis’s] 
products, patients would be unable to buy them and distributors 
would have no incentive to make purchases from [Novartis].  The 
purchase cycle commences with a prescription from physicians, 
who are therefore the appropriate target of the Reps’ sales efforts.  
When the physician writes a prescription for the [Novartis] prod-
uct, then a sale can take place. Without prescriptions, patients can-
not buy the drugs and there is no sale.125
The fundamental nature of this relationship is highlighted by the fact that No-
vartis spends in excess of $500 million annually to have its sales representatives 
meet with physicians to get them to prescribe company products.126
This reasoning was subsequently endorsed and elaborated upon in the federal 
district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Baum v. Astrazeneca 
LP.127  In that case, which was brought under Pennsylvania state wage and hour 
law, the court noted that the markets for pharmaceuticals and medical services do 
not function like typical markets.128 This is due, at least in part, to the “profession-
 ________________________  
 119. Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 527 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1981), aff’d, 684 F.2d 565 (8th Cir.1982) 
(explaining sales in contract case). 
 120. Id. at 1094 n.3. 
 121. Id.
 122. Id.
 123. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 650. 
 124. Id. at 650-51. 
 125. Id.
 126. Id. at 650. 
 127. Baum v. Astrazeneca LP, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
 128. Id. at 675.  Pennsylvania state law contains exemptions from coverage for outside salespeople and 
administrative employees.  See 34 PA. CODE § 231.83 (2009) (administrative employees); PA. CONS. STAT. § 
333.105(a)(5) (2009) (outside salesman). 
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al culture of physicians” who operate under what is sometimes referred to as a 
“professional paradigm.”129  In this situation, regulation and professional ethics 
substitute for the workings of a free market, with physicians acting as substitute 
decision makers, rather than sources of education or advice for consumers.130  The 
physicians’ decisions are made based on unbiased science.131  Because the doctors 
possess knowledge generally inaccessible to lay-people, they control the decision 
making.132
This role of doctors as substitute decision-makers emerged conco-
mitant to the belief that patients themselves are incapable of under-
standing sufficient information to make intelligent medical deci-
sions [footnote omitted].  In other words, the information asymme-
try between physician and patient is simply a bridge too far:  be-
cause only physicians have the extensive required scientific know-
ledge and training to make informed health care choices, they 
alone, must make medical decisions, as patients simply could not 
possibly make wise decisions for themselves.  This pure profes-
sional paradigm empowers physicians and subordinates individual 
consumer preference and choice.133
In reaching its conclusion, the Novartis court characterized the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument that the sales representatives’ work was non-exempt “promotional” work 
rather than “sales” work as “simply wrong.”134  This is because the Department of 
Labor’s distinction between exempt sales work and non-exempt promotional work 
is invoked only where the promotional work is incidental to sales made by other 
employees as opposed to themselves, the latter being the situation in the pharma-
ceuticals industry where it is clear from the compensation structure that the sales 
representatives’ work is to generate sales for themselves.135  This is because their 
work, namely visiting physicians to generate sales, is tantamount to obtaining a 
commitment to buy, which the Department of Labor considers exempt.136 Further, 
the sales representatives have the independence typically associated with outside 
 ________________________  
 129. Id. at 679-80 (“[T]he Court believes that the professional paradigm still accurately describes much of 
the actual practices of the health services industry.”); Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical 
Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 419-21 (1990). 
 130. Id. at 678 (citing James F. Blumstein, Healthcare Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: 
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1466 (1994)). 
 131. Id. at 679. 
 132. Id.
 133. Id. at 680.  This type of thinking was echoed in a more recent article addressing in part why medical 
savings accounts in which consumers of healthcare, namely the public, would be more frugal because they would 
bargain with their physicians for services.  The article compared this notion in the context of the doctor-patient 
relationship like relying “in the sheep to negotiate with the wolves.”  Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE 
NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 44. 
 134. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 651. 
 135. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a)) (“Promotional work that is actually performed incidental to and in 
conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt work.  On the other hand, promotional 
work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else is not exempt outside sale work.”).
 136. Id. at 651-52 (citing Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22162). 
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salespersons, namely to set the schedule for their work day, to have rare direct su-
pervision, and to work away from the office.137  For all of these reasons, the Novar-
tis court concluded that the company’s sales representatives were exempt as out-
side salespersons under the FLSA.138
The inquiry did not end there, however.  The court went on to conclude that 
even in the absence of the outside sales exemption, the plaintiffs were also exempt 
as administrative employees.139 Initially, if the “administrative/production dichot-
omy” is applied, the plaintiffs were clearly not production employees because they 
were not involved in the production of the defendant’s drugs.140  Further, because 
the sales representatives were responsible for disseminating Novartis’ information 
into the marketplace, meaning to the prescribing physicians, their work went to the 
heart of the company’s success, and they are involved in the general business oper-
ations sufficient to satisfy the first part of the test for the administrative employee 
exemption.141
The court then concluded that the sales representatives also exercised enough 
independent judgment and discretion to satisfy the second prong of the test.  Spe-
cifically, sales representatives were expected to “use initiative” to increase the 
number of prescriptions written, typically by developing a rapport with the medical 
staff with whom they had met, presenting information within certain parameters in 
the most effective way in light of variables including time constraints, patient base, 
and prescription history.142  The sales representatives also set their schedules and 
used their entertainment budgets to host events and thereby increase sales.143  As a 
result, the court determined that summary judgment was appropriate on this basis.  
Similar reasoning was applied by the Pennsylvania district court in Baum v. Astra-
zeneca LP to grant the employer summary judgment in that case as well.144
On the other side of the spectrum are two cases from the federal district court 
for the District of Connecticut.145  In Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma-
 ________________________  
 137. Id. at 652.  There is no doubt that the plaintiffs meet the minimum salary requirement to qualify for the 
exemption.  Id.
 138. Id.  Interestingly, the Court then turned to the analogous California state overtime claims, and recog-
nized that while the Barnick, Menes, and D’Este decisions may have been erroneous to some degree when consi-
dered in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ramirez, 978 P.2d at 5-9, which held that it is inap-
propriate to rely on the FLSA and interpreting guidance concerning the outside sales exemption when analyzing 
California state law on the issue because the language used for each exemption is not parallel, Ramirez was distin-
guishable from the case before the court because there the plaintiff was a deliveryman who also made sales and the 
inquiry concerned the primary function of his job.  Here the issue is whether the plaintiffs were making sales at all.  
 139. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 652. 
 140. Id. at 655 (citing Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that insurance 
company’s marketing representatives, who were the primary contacts with the agents that sold the policies, were 
exempt because they were not involved in production work—they did not create the insurance policies being 
written—rather they were involved in promoting them)). 
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 657. 
143. Id.  Based on this same reason, the court also concluded that the plaintiffs were exempt as administra-
tive employees under California law.  Id. at 658.  In Novartis, the court also engaged in a brief analysis of the 
highly compensated employee exemption.  Id.  This exemption however is dependent to a certain degree on the 
factors relating to the administrative employee exemption and therefore, is not reviewed here. 
 144. Baum, 605 F. Supp. 2d 669. 
 145. Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Conn. 2009) (motion for interlocutory appeal 
granted Apr. 17, 2009); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc. (Ruggeri I), 585 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D. Conn. 
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ceuticals, Inc., as in Novartis, the issue on summary judgment was whether phar-
maceutical sales representatives were entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA, or 
whether the representatives were exempt from the Act’s coverage, either because 
the plaintiffs qualified as outside salespersons (both sides moved for summary 
judgment on this issue) or administrative employees (only defendant moved for 
summary judgment on this issue).146  And like in Novartis, the Ruggeri court de-
termined that the initial inquiry concerning the outside sales exemption is whether 
the employees were actually engaged in “sales.” 147  Yet the Connecticut district 
court reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that because the pharmaceutical 
sales representatives did not actually make sales or obtain contracts for orders 
when they visited physicians, they did not qualify as outside salespersons for FLSA 
purposes.148  Specifically, the sales representatives did not and could not obtain 
contracts or orders; they lacked the authority to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of their employer’s sales; they were not permitted to negotiate or enter contracts 
with healthcare professionals; and they did not take orders for products from the 
pharmacies to which the products were sold.149  Further, physicians did not place 
orders for the products the sales representatives promoted.150  At most, the doctors 
created a demand for the product by writing a prescription.151  As a result, given 
that the exemptions are to be narrowly construed as a matter of law, the sales repre-
sentatives could not be said to make sales within the meaning of the statute.152
In reaching this conclusion, the court declined to rely on the California cases 
for three reasons.153  Initially, those cases were based on California state law, not 
the FLSA, and the fact that the federal courts in California applied an FLSA analy-
sis as persuasive authority does not mean that interpretations of California law are 
persuasive authority for interpretation of the FLSA.154  Second, the California Su-
preme Court has concluded that it is inappropriate to rely on federal regulations or 
interpretations of the FLSA when applying the state’s outside sales exemption be-
cause the language of the two exemptions do not track each other, indicating an 
intent that they are to be interpreted differently.155  Accordingly, the California 
decisions interpreting the state’s outside sales exemption based on the FLSA were 
incorrectly reasoned, even if they might otherwise constitute persuasive authori-
ty.156
2008); Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc. (Ruggeri II), 585 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D. Conn. 2008) (motion 
for reconsideration denied May 26, 2009).  
 146. Ruggeri I, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 266-77. 
 147. Id. at 266. 
 148. Ruggeri I, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 149. Id.
 150. Id.
 151. Id. at 268. 
 152. Id. at 267. 
 153. Id. at 269. 
 154. Id.
 155. Id. (citing Ramirez, 978 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1999)). See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d 
194, 206 (Cal. 2004) (Ramirez “reversed the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the plaintiff was exempt under an IWC 
wage order defining ‘outside salesperson,’ largely because the court had inappropriately relied on certain federal 
regulations, which varied from California law, in making that  determination.”).
 156. Ruggeri I, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70. 
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Finally, the analysis in the California decisions was faulty because the courts 
never conducted an initial inquiry as to the appropriate threshold question, namely, 
whether the plaintiffs in those cases were actually engaged in sales.157  Instead, the 
courts incorrectly focused on an indicia-of-sales analysis, such as whether the jobs 
at issue were advertised as “sales” positions, whether the employees referred to 
themselves as sales people, whether they received commissions, whether they re-
ceived sales training, and whether they operated independently.158  For these rea-
sons, those cases should not be followed.159
Similarly, the sales representatives did not qualify as administrative employees 
as a matter of law.  While no one disputes that the job required non-manual work 
and met the minimum compensation thresholds, it could not be said on the factual 
record presented whether the primary duties of the job related to the company’s 
general business operations, or that while the job required the exercise of some 
discretion, whether or not that discretion was exercised with respect to “matters of 
significance.”160     
Without a full factual record about Boehringer’s operations, it is 
impossible to say whether the matters over which Plaintiffs had 
discretion were matters of significance to Boehringer.  The record 
does not reveal, for example, whether demand for Boehringer’s 
products was ever affected-or whether Boehringer’s revenues ever 
fell-when PSRs other than Plaintiffs chose to formulate presenta-
tion ideas different from those [Plaintiff] Ms. Ruggeri formulated; 
or used metrics different from those she used to determine which 
physicians to entertain over a meal; or took a different route 
through their geographical areas than did [Plaintiff] Mr. Jaramillo; 
or stopped into retail pharmacies more or less frequently than he 
did; or read physicians’ demeanors differently than [Plaintiff] Mr. 
Naik in choosing when to be pushy, or even read physicians’ de-
meanors at all.  Moreover, the record does not reveal whether Boe-
hringer was even concerned about the effects of PSRs exercising 
their discretion in different ways.  As Plaintiffs point out . . . 
[t]here is also no evidence of how significant Defendant considers 
the matters it left to its PSRs’ discretion.  The fact that Boehringer 
so tightly controlled the message Plaintiffs presented to physicians 
 ________________________  
 157. Id.
 158. Id. at 266, 270-71 (noting that one of the California cases, D’Este, is “difficult to parse” and that the 
plaintiff in that case would obtain a commitment from physicians to prescribe Bayer products and did sign a con-
tract with a hospital to use Bayer products, unlike in the other sales representative cases, and which may have 
supported the conclusion that the representative in that case was engaged in actual sales, unlike here).  See also 
Ruggeri II, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16 (addressing D’Este). 
 159. Id.
160. Id. at 272-75. 
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could be found to mean that Defendant left to its PSRs’ discretion 
matters it considered insignificant.161
Accordingly, application of the administrative exemption on summary judg-
ment was inappropriate.162
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the 1945 Department of 
Labor Opinion Letter concluding that “medical detailists” were exempt administra-
tive employees because those employees had different responsibilities, including 
that they were consulted with respect to nutritional problems encountered by hos-
pitals and determined whether the use of a subject’s product was related to the oc-
currence of an epidemic—responsibilities that the pharmaceutical sales representa-
tives in this case did not have.163
The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion for an interlocutory ap-
peal with respect to its decision granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment concluding that they were not exempt as outside salespersons under FLSA, 
rejecting the argument that there was a substantial ground for difference of opinion 
on this issue.164  At the time of this decision, the Novartis decision on summary 
judgment had not yet been handed down. 
More recently, in Kuzinski v. Schering Corporation, the federal district court in 
Connecticut had an opportunity to revisit the issue, this time after the Novartis de-
cision had been rendered.165  Similar to the other cases, the plaintiffs were sales 
representatives whose job was to “introduce[] and make known its prescription
drugs to physicians, pharmacists, hospitals, managed care organizations, and buy-
ing groups.”166  Company revenue was dependent upon physician prescriptions.167
To increase market share, the employer also relied upon its sales representatives 
who met with medical professionals in assigned territories and encouraged the pre-
scription of company products.168  Nevertheless, the sales representatives did not 
enter into contracts on the employer’s behalf for company products, obtain orders, 
or get binding commitments.169
As in other cases, the work required the representatives to be out of the compa-
ny offices, doing field work, meeting with doctors, entertaining at lunches and din-
ners, and attending training sessions and conferences.170   The company chose 
which physicians the sales representative would “target.”171  Supervision of field 
work occurred when a district manager would sometimes “ridealong” with the 
 ________________________  
 161. Ruggeri I, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 275-76. 
 162. Id. at 276-77. 
 163. Id. at 276. 
 164. Ruggeri II, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 165. Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (motion for interlocutory appeal granted April 17, 2009) (addressing 
Novartis). 
 166. Id. at 386-87. 
 167. Id. at 388. 
 168. Id.
 169. Id. at 391. 
 170. Id. at 388. 
 171. Id. at 389. 
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sales representative.172  Sales representatives were paid a base salary plus incentive 
payments, which in turn were based roughly on the number of company products 
prescribed in the representatives’ respective geographic territories.173  The compa-
ny characterized the work as “sales,” considered the plaintiffs’ conduct as “sell-
ing,” and sought people with “sales skills” to fill the sales representative posi-
tions.174
Analyzing these facts, which are similar to those in Ruggeri, the court came to 
the same conclusion that the plaintiff-sales representatives were not exempt from 
the FLSA as outside salespersons.175  In so doing, the court criticized the Novartis
court’s outside sales analysis on several grounds.176  Initially, in order to qualify as 
an outside salesperson, the employee has to make “sales.”177 Applying the FLSA’s 
definition of that term, the sales representatives clearly did not engage in any sale, 
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale or other disposition, shipment for 
sale, or transfer of title to tangible property as required under the statute and regu-
lations.178  In fact, the sales representatives and physicians lacked the capacity to 
consummate sales, as the sales representatives are barred by law and by their em-
ployers from entering into contracts or binding commitments with doctors for pre-
scriptions.179 Accordingly, any argument that the plaintiffs were exempt is based on 
nothing more than an artificial attempt to “back-fit” the FLSA onto industry prac-
tices.180  At most, the sales representatives worked to increase overall demand for a 
product by “laying the groundwork” for another employee to obtain a commitment 
for a purchase which, by definition, is non-exempt work.181
The court also distinguished Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons and relied upon in the 
Novartis decision for its description of the work that sales representatives of car-
diac pacemaker manufacturers did in promoting the company’s products.182  While 
the Novartis court relied upon Medtronic’s discussion that the company sold its 
products to hospitals based on physicians’ recommendations, the decision in that 
case was unrelated to the FLSA’s outside sales exemption and did not analyze the 
term “sales” as applied under the Act or the rule requiring narrow interpretation of 
 ________________________  
 172. Id. at 388. 
 173. Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 389-90. 
 174. Id. at 390. 
 175. Id. at 402-03. 
 176. Id. at 397-98.  However, the court in Kuzinski did not engage in an administrative employee exemption. 
 177. Id. at 397 (citing Clements v. Serco, 530 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008) (civilian military recruiters 
for the army are not outside salesmen even though they engaged in sales training and “sold” the idea of joining the 
army to potential recruits)). 
 178. Id. at 398; 29 U.S.C. § 203(k); 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). 
 179. Id. at 398. 
 180. Id. at 399.  See Ruggeri I, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 272. 
 181. Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 399.  The court also distinguished Gregory v. First Title of Amer., Inc., 
555 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) on the ground that there the marketing executive did make sales, because 
once an order for title insurance services was obtained by the plaintiff, the sale was complete.  In Kuzinski, the 
marketing executive did all of the work necessary to reach an agreement with a customer.  Pharmaceutical sales 
representatives on the other hand do not even communicate with the entities that do the actual purchasing of their 
products.  Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400. 
 182. Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
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the statutory exemptions.183  Accordingly, Medtronic is inapposite, and the Novar-
tis decision was wrongly decided.184  That being said, in the wake of the Novartis
decision, this time the district court granted the defendant’s motion for an interlo-
cutory appeal.185
Still, other courts take a position somewhere in between Novartis, Baum and 
the California cases on the one hand and Ruggeri and Kuzinski on the other.  
Amendola v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, another case in the federal district court for the 
Southern District of New York, involved a motion for discovery of the names and 
addresses of potential class members, authorization for notice of a collective action 
to be sent, and equitable tolling of any claims to be filed.186  As with other pharma-
ceutical companies, the sales representatives promoted company products to physi-
cians, hospitals, clinics and medical institutions, worked outside the company of-
fices and were paid a salary plus incentive compensation.187  Their primary respon-
sibility was to be in the field visiting medical providers to influence prescription 
practices.188  Each representative was given a list of medical providers to call, 
guidelines for how many calls should be made on an average day, and a core mes-
sage to deliver.189  The sales representatives set their own daily and weekly sche-
dules and could add and subtract from their list of assigned providers subject to 
supervisor approval.190
Like the other cases, the physicians visited did not buy drugs.191  Rather, they 
wrote the prescriptions for patients to present to pharmacies to purchase the pre-
scribed medication.192  The sales representatives also did not sell drugs to providers 
or take orders for drugs.193  The representatives in this case did, however, ask for 
non-binding commitments to prescribe the medications they were promoting.194
Again, the court’s inquiry began with whether the plaintiffs were actually en-
gaged in “sales” work.195 In reviewing the sales representatives’ responsibilities, 
the court readily determined that influencing physicians to prescribe drugs and 
obtain non-binding commitments do not constitute a sale, exchange, contract to 
sell, consignment for sale or a shipment for sale “as these terms are customarily 
understood” under the FLSA.196  Indeed, the Amendola court went so far as to cha-
 ________________________  
 183. Id. at 400-01.  Palmieri v. Nynex Long Distance Co., No. Civ. 04-138-PS, 2005 WL 767170 (D. Me. 
Mar. 28, 2005), aff’d, 437 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2006) is also inapplicable because in that case, there was no dispute 
that the plaintiff made some sales.  As a result, an indicia-of-sales review was appropriate.  Here, because the sales 
representatives make no sales, the subsequent indicia-of-sales analysis does not apply. 
 184. See Kuzinski, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 397, 401. 
 185. Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 614 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Conn. 2009) (court order denying motion for 
certification as collective action without prejudice and granting motion for interlocutory appeal).
 186. Amendola v. Britsol-Myers Squibb Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 187. Id. at 463. 
 188. Id.
 189. Id. at 464. 
 190. Id.
 191. Id.
 192. Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
 193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 470. 
 196. Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). 
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racterize this conclusion as “unsurprising” given that the medical providers do not 
purchase the drugs from the sales representatives and, in fact, that federal law pro-
hibits the sales representatives from selling pharmaceutical products.197
In reaching this conclusion, the court, like in Ruggeri, rejected the argument 
that the plaintiffs were exempt because they received specialized training, were 
given sales titles, their positions as originally advertised were in sales, and they 
lacked direct supervision.198  This is because these factors become relevant only 
where the employee has “mixed duties” involving sales and non-sales work.199
Here, the employees did not do any sales work at all.200
Similarly, the court declined to follow the California cases because those cases, 
which interpreted state law, failed to acknowledge that the FLSA exemptions are to 
be narrowly construed against the employers and relied on the various factors ap-
plicable in a mixed duty analysis without “grappling” with whether the plaintiffs 
were actually engaged in sales.201  For these reasons, they were erroneously de-
cided.  
The Amendola court then reached the same conclusion as the other New York 
federal district court did in Novartis with respect to the administrative employee 
determination.202  Bristol-Myers’s sales representatives, who clearly do non-manual 
work and earn above the mandatory minimum, represent the company in meetings 
with medical providers to promote company drugs.203  Accordingly, reasoned the 
court, company success depends in part on the sales representatives’ ability to edu-
cate physicians about Bristol-Myers’s drugs, and as such, the work is “directly re-
lated to . . . management or business operations.”204  Considering the administra-
tive/production distinction, the court held that because the company’s products are 
the drugs it designs, patents, and manufactures, and the sales representatives do not 
produce these products, they fall on the administrative side of the line.205
Next, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ work involved exercise of the type 
of discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance suffi-
cient to render the work exempt.206  Specifically, each representative tailored the 
content of his or her presentation to each medical provider based on a variety of 
factors and independently decided what message would be most effective.207  Fur-
ther, each one strategically managed a call list, exercising judgment in deciding 
how often to visit a doctor or whether to add new providers to that list.208  In this 
case, the representatives also managed samples, deciding how effectively each pro-
vider would use the samples and determining how best to manage promotional 
 ________________________  
 197. Id.
 198. Id.
 199. Id. at 472. 
 200. Id. at 471. 
 201. Id. at 472. 
 202. Id. at 472-77. 
 203. Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77. 
 204. Id. at 477. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.
 207. Id.
 208. Id.
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budgets, organizing group lectures or individual meals for providers.209  These de-
cisions were made free from supervision and drove the company’s business.210
Based on all of these facts, the court concluded that there was sufficient likelihood 
that the sales representatives were exempt administrative employees to deny their 
motion for authorization to send out notice of the lawsuit to other employees with 
potential claims.211
The federal district court in New Jersey came to a conclusion similar to that in 
Amendola.  Relying on the rationale applied in Ruggeri, the court in Smith v. John-
son & Johnson held that the pharmaceutical sales representatives in that case were 
not exempt from FLSA overtime requirements as outside salespersons.212  Where 
the employees had no capacity to make actual sales, they did not qualify for the 
exemption.213 While it is true that physicians create a “chokepoint” in the sales of 
pharmaceuticals, this reality does not change the analysis.214  Where the plaintiffs’ 
conduct could not wind up in anything more than a non-binding declaration of in-
tent to prescribe a drug, this is not enough to constitute “sales” under the FLSA and 
invoke the exemption.215
Nevertheless, following the Amendola decision, the New Jersey federal district 
court concluded that the sales representatives were exempt from the FLSA’s over-
time requirements as administrative employees.216 Although the plaintiffs’ work 
does not dictate corporate marketing policy, it does drive market demand and, 
therefore, substantially affects the operation of a particular segment of the business 
as required under the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the exemption.217
Similarly, under the administrative/production dichotomy, the sales representatives 
were not production workers because the employer’s business is not about educat-
ing physicians about their products, rather it is about manufacturing and distribut-
ing those products.218  In terms of exercising discretion and independent judgment, 
while the court recognized that the plaintiffs in Amendola had more discretion than 
Smith in this case, the fact that the plaintiff was able to request permission to visit 
new physicians and update her marketing plan to be more effective in her territory, 
even though she needed supervisory approval, was sufficient to qualify her as ex-
empt under the FLSA.219  This conclusion was further supported by Smith’s work 
driving the market for the drugs she worked with and her involvement with her 
 ________________________  
 209. Id.
 210. Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
 211. Id.
 212. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, Civil Action No. 06-4787 (JLL), 2008 WL 5427802, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 
30, 2008). 
 213. Id. at *7. 
 214. See id.
 215. Id. at *7. 
 216. Id. at *10. 
 217. Id. (citing Final Rule, supra note 19, at 22138). 
 218. Smith, 2008 WL 5427802, at *11. 
 219. Id.
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manager planning long-term and short-term business objectives.220  Accordingly, 
summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant.221
ANOTHER INTERPRETATION
There is another statutory interpretation based on a simple analysis which leads 
to a more straightforward result than any of the decisions above.  The FLSA de-
fines the term “sale” as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale,
shipment for sale, or other disposition.”222 The phrase “other disposition,” which is 
not defined in the statute or the regulations, has received little attention from the 
courts.  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, under stan-
dard rules of statutory construction, the term should be given its ordinary mean-
ing.223
The American Heritage College Dictionary defines “disposition” in relevant 
part as an “[a]rrangement, positioning, or distribution;” a “final settlement;” an “act 
of disposing of; a bestowal or transfer to another;” and “[t]he power or liberty to 
control, direct, or dispose” and “[m]anagement control.”224 Webster’s New Inter-
national Dictionary defines the term similarly as the “[a]ct or power of disposing, 
or state of being disposed;” and “[t]he administering of anything; management.”225
The same sources define the term “dispose” as “[t]o place or set in a particular or-
der; arrange;” “[t]o put [(business affairs, for example)] into correct, definitive, or 
conclusive form;” “[t]o settle or decide a matter;” “[t]o distribute and put in place; 
to arrange; to set in order;” “[t]o assign to a certain place or condition; appoint;” 
and “[t]o regulate; adjust; settle; determine.”226
Applying these definitions, it is logical to conclude that the term “other dispo-
sition,” as it is used to define a “sale” under the Act, includes a physician’s deci-
sion to write a prescription for a particular medication.  As the district court in 
Baum recognized, the purchase of pharmaceuticals does not operate in a typical 
free market.  As part of the “professional paradigm,” the specialized knowledge 
necessary to make decisions concerning the purchase of drugs is beyond the ability 
of the typical layperson.  As a result, the decision-making process is essentially 
assigned by the end purchaser—the patient—to a middleman—the physician.  In 
fact, this assignment of responsibility is required as the medications at issue cannot 
be purchased in the absence of a prescription.  The doctor then takes this assigned 
responsibility and executes it, although not by physically making the purchase, a 
ministerial act.  Rather, the physician writes a prescription, the only legal method 
by which the drugs can be purchased.  While it is true that the act of writing the 
prescription may not constitute a “sale” in the traditional sense, after all a patient 
 ________________________  
 220. Id. at *12 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b)).  
 221. Id.
 222. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (emphasis added). 
 223. See, e.g., Gross v. Financial Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (using dictionaries to analyze 
statutory terms); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-53 (2004). 
 224. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 401 (3d ed. 1997). 
 225. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 752 (2d ed. 1950). 
 226. See supra note 224, at 250; supra note 225, at 117.  
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may never go to the pharmacy to pick up or pay for the medication, under a dictio-
nary definition it does constitute a “management” of the process and exercise of the 
“[t]he power or liberty to control” the decision about whether the purchase of a 
prescribed medication is appropriate in a particular instance and which medication 
is best suited for that situation.  Accordingly, it is appropriate for the courts to con-
clude that the pharmaceutical sales representatives’ core function—to influence 
physician prescription practices—constitutes an “other disposition” as that term is 
used to define a “sale” under the FLSA.  As a result, the pharmaceuticals sales rep-
resentatives’ “primary duty” is clearly to engage in “sales,” and they should be 
treated as exempt outside salespersons not covered by the Act’s overtime require-
ments. 
Whether the sales representatives’ work qualifies as exempt administrative 
work is a more nuanced question because it cannot be answered by looking at the 
job’s central function—namely to influence medical prescription practices, and 
some of the other job responsibilities vary by employer.227  Nevertheless, a review 
of some of the aspects of the job common across the industry reveals that this ex-
emption likely does not apply here, or at least as the court in Ruggeri concluded, 
not as a matter of law.  The Department of Labor has expressly recognized that 
work “promoting sales” constitutes the type of “servicing,” as opposed to produc-
tion work that directly relates to the general business operations of a company, 
such that sales representative work might qualify as the type of administrative re-
sponsibilities exempt under the FLSA.228
Nevertheless, the work appears to lack the type of exercise of discretion and 
independent judgment that exempt administrative work requires.  While it is true 
that the sales representatives typically operate without much direct supervision and 
set their schedules on a daily basis, this alone is not enough to satisfy the test.  As 
set forth above, the applicable regulations issued by the Department of Labor set 
forth a non-exclusive list which demonstrates the type of discretion required to 
invoke the exemption.229  A review of this list indicates that the sales representa-
tives’ work is non-exempt.  Generally speaking, pharmaceutical sales representa-
tives do not have the authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement man-
agement policies or operating practices.  They do not carry out major assignments 
in conducting the operations of the business.  While as a group, their work affects 
business operations, each representative is typically assigned only a small number 
of products in a narrow territory, limiting the impact of any one or small group of 
representatives.  The sales representatives do not have the authority to commit the 
employer to matters having a significant financial impact.  They are not authorized 
to waive or deviate from established policies or procedures without approval.  They 
do not have the authority to negotiate or bind the company on significant matters, 
and they are not involved in planning long-term or short-term business objectives, 
at least not beyond their own sales objectives, satisfaction of which typically leads 
 ________________________  
 227. See, e.g., Smith, 2008 WL 5427802, at *11 (noting responsibilities vary by company). 
 228. Final Rule, supra note 19, at 21138. 
 229. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b). 
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to increased compensation.  They also are not authorized to resolve matters of sig-
nificance on behalf of management, and they do not represent the company in han-
dling complaints or dispute resolution.  Rather, the sales representatives are more 
involved in carrying out the day-to-day operations of the business.  All of these 
factors weigh against invoking the administrative exemption. 
While it is true that the sales representatives do decide how to best formulate 
their presentations to physicians to increase sales, this responsibility is unconvinc-
ing as a basis upon which to invoke the exemption.230  As the Ruggeri court recog-
nized, there is little evidence that the sales representatives’ exercise of discretion 
was with regard to any matter that the employers considered significant.231  Indeed, 
if this type of exercise of discretion were enough, it is hard to imagine an outside 
sales representative who spends the majority of his or her time in the field that 
would not qualify as an administrative employee. 
In reaching this conclusion, it should be noted that the medical detailists ad-
dressed in the Department of Labor’s 1945 Opinion Letter are different than the 
sales representatives involved in current litigation.  Unlike the medical detailists, 
there is no indication in any of the recent cases that the sales representatives are 
consulted with respect to individual nutrition problems or whether a product is re-
lated to the outbreak of something like an epidemic.  There is also no discussion of 
the sales representatives at issue training other sales personnel.232  Accordingly, the 
Opinion Letter is of little value to the analysis here.  In short, while there may be 
exceptions, as a general matter, pharmaceutical sales representatives likely do not 
qualify as administrative employees under the FLSA. 
CONCLUSION
Whether sales representatives in the pharmaceutical industry are entitled to 
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act is unclear from the decisions of the 
federal district courts across the country.  The issue is complicated because, al-
though the function of these employees is to increase sales, they do not address 
their efforts to the actual purchaser of the products they represent.  Yet, a careful 
review of the Act reveals that although sales representatives generally lack suffi-
cient discretion to qualify them as administrative employees, their work is suffi-
ciently sales-based to invoke the FLSA’s statutory exemption for outside salesper-
son.  Accordingly, as these cases wind their way through the appellate process, the 
courts should conclude that pharmaceutical sales representatives are not entitled to 
overtime pay. 
 ________________________  
 230. See, e.g., Amendola, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 472-77 (applying the administrative employee exemption).  
 231. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Applicability of Exemption for Administrative Employees to Medical Detailists, supra notes 71-74 
and accompanying text. 
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